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I. Introduction
Until the late 1980s, asset securitisation was an US-American finance technique.
Meanwhile this technique has been used also in some European countries, although to a
much lesser extent. While some of them have adopted or developed their legal and
regulatory framework, others remain on earlier stages. That may be because of the lack of
economic incentives, but also because of remaining regulatory or legal impediments.4
The following overview deals with the legal and regulatory environment in five selected
European countries. It is structured as follows: First, this finance technique will be
described in outline to the benefit of the reader who might not be familiar with it. A further
part will report the recent development and the underlying economic reasons that drive this
development. The main part will then deal with international aspects and give an overview
of some legal and regulatory issues in five European legislations. Tax and accounting
questions are, however, excluded. Concluding remarks follow.
II. Model of a Securitization Transaction
Asset securitization can be generally defined as the process of transferring certain
receivables, such as bank loans, credit card receivables, or trade receivables, from their
"orginator" or owner to a separate entity. This entity in turn will issue and sell securities
representing interests in such receivables. A special variation are mortgage-backed
securities. The following chart shows a simplified structure of an ABS transaction.5
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Although there are many methods for securitizing assets, most securitization transactions
involve some or all of the following parties: (1) the initial owner of the assets; (2) the issuer
of the debt or equity instruments; (3) the investment bankers who assist in structuring the
transaction and who underwrite or place the securities; (4) the rating agencies; (5) a credit
enhancer who provides credit support through a letter of credit, guarantee, or other
assurance; (6) a servicer who collects payments due on the underlying assets and pays
them over to the security holders; (7) a trustee, who deals with the credit enhancer,
servicer, and issuer on behalf of the security holders; and (8) legal counsel.
The owner of the assets to be securitized is usually a bank, finance company or other
holder of income-producing assets such as mortgages, auto loans, credit card receivables
or other receivables. These assets are typically pooled together and sold to a special-
purpose vehicle so as to separate the assets from other assets of the originating institution.
This special purpose vehicle will then issue and sell securities representing interests in the
assets. The issued securities may be either debt or equity. In order to ensure that the
issued securities receive a high rating from the rating agencies, some type of credit
enhancement, such as a letter of credit, is usally used. Some issuers provide for internal
credit support by issuing two classes of securities, a "senior" class, which is generally
triple-A rated and enjoys certain priorities with respect to collections on the assets, and a
"subordinated" class, which is rated in a lower rating category and is subordinated in part to
the right of the senior class to receive such collections.
Once assets have been securitized, some party must continue to collect payments on the
assets and disburse those proceeds to the securities holders. Typically this party will be the
originator (seller) of such assets.
One of the key advantages to securitizing assets is that the securities may often receive  a
rating significantly higher than that of the originating institution itself. Therefore rating
agencies like, for instance, Standard & Poors or Moody's Investors Service, will evaluate
the quality of the underlying assets, look at the overall risk profile of the originator, the
collection procedures, the selection of the receivables transferred to the issuing entity and
so on.
III. Historical Development and Economic Forces behind Securitization
A. Historical Background and Recent Development
A variety of legal and economic factors have combined in recent years to cause a
widespread boom in asset or mortgage securitization in the U.S.
1. In the United States the
total outstanding asset (including mortgage) backed securities currently are well in excess6
of 2 trillion U.S.-$ with daily trading volumes at the larger investment banks in the tens of
billions of dollars
2.
This rapid growth has naturally resulted in numerous attempts to transfer this technique to
markets outside the United States, most notably to Europe. However, these projects have
met with mixed success.
The largest non-U.S. market has developed in the United Kingdom. The next largest
market is France. Other European markets have also begun to develop but are still in the
nascent stages. Spain and Belgium have adopted a legislative framework only recently.
Isolated transactions have also been completed in Italy and Germany. As to the
Netherlands, no public off-balance sheet mortgage or asset-backed transactions have
been done to date to my knowledge
3. However, some securitised transactions in other
countries have used Dutch special purpose vehicles as issuing entities, and although no
public deals have been brought, the domestic market has seen certain private placements
backed by diversified assets.
Asset securitization as it is known today got its start with "the development of the modern
mortgage-backed security"
4. Initially, such development began because of a U.S. federal
government desire to develop a secondary mortgage market for residential mortgage
loans
5. Thus the first asset-backed securities issued were backed by pools of mortgages
insured or guaranteed by Government agencies such as the Government National
Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(Freddie Mac), and the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)
6. Later on
banks responded to pressures on their profitability and legal changes with securitization of
their assets. In the 1980s securitization spread to non-mortgage assets, namely loans,
credit-card and other receivables. What are the economic forces that drive this
development?
B. Economic Forces behind Securitization
In order to truly understand the development of asset securitization, it is important to
understand the forces which made, and continue to make, securitization desirable. In
particular, what advantages does asset securitization have over more traditional forms of
funding?
1. Depositary Institutions
In part, securitization developed as a result of economic and legal pressures on depositary
institutions.
Traditionally, banks and thrifts have played the role of financial intermediaries, engaging in
what is known as "spread banking", whereby such institutions gather liabilities (typically
deposits) to fund assets (typically loans) and retain as profit the spread between the total
cost of the liabilities and the total yield on the assets
7. Asset securitization offers an
alternative source of funding, and may therefore be attractive to many of these depositary
institutions
8. Asset securitization allows assets to be removed from the institution's balance
sheets, and thus reduces the amount of capital such institution must maintain to comply
with regulatory requirements
9. Securitization also breaks up the traditional role of
depositary institutions as financial intermediaries into its component parts, allowing for
specialization by institutions with comparative advantages in one or more of these
functions
10.
2. In General
Asset securitization has further advantages which apply to all sellers of receivables. First,
securitization is often more cost attractive than sales of whole loans because it offers
investors a more liquid investment (a tradeable security) with more desirable risk
characteristics and thus appeals to a wider pool of potential purchasers
11. Securitization is
particularly cost attractive for sellers whose access to other forms of credit may be limited,
since asset-backed securities are rated on the merits of the underlying assets rather than
on the financial status of the issuing or selling company
12. Second, asset securitization
reduces the seller's exposure to interest rate risk, prepayment risk, and credit risk
13 by7
allocating some or all of such risks to the purchasers of the securities and a credit
enhancement vehicle
14. Finally, asset securitization allows the seller to more efficiently
match the terms of its assets with those of its liabilities, since asset-backed securities can
be issued for terms which correspond to the term of the assets underlying such securities
15.
IV. International Aspects of Securitisation
Securitization can have international connotations in several ways. Issuers of securities
backed by assets from one country may sell such securities in foreign markets. And
owners of assets in one country may use a special purpose vehicle based in another
country to issue mortgage- or asset-backed securities. At this point we can only point at the
regulatory and legal issues that will come up in the future with the further
internationalization of the securitization business.
A. Sale of ABS or MBS Internationally
The development of securitization internationally began with the sale of securities backed
by U.S. assets in the European and Japanese markets
16.
The first step in securitizing U.S. assets in markets abroad came in the form of Eurodollar
deals
17. In these deals the U.S. issuers sold dollar-denominated asset-backed securities to
purchasers in European countries, often listing the securities on the Luxembourg Stock
Exchange
18. The process of tapping the Eurodollar market was fairly simple to achieve from
a legal perspective since the Eurobond market is relatively unregulated, and it enabled
U.S. issuers to expand their sources of capital
19.
Mortgage-backed securities especially have been sold extensively in Europe, in particular
bonds that have been structured to look like the type of instruments European investors are
used to buying: products such as Libor floaters, and PAC bonds that look more like
corporate bonds and have less prepayment risk than the traditional MBS
20.
The sale of securities backed by U.S. assets to foreign markets is likely to continue in
parallel with the general globalization of capital markets
21. Through this process, issuers
are able to optimize the pricing and terms of securities issued, sometimes through the
overseas issuance of a security with a particular currency and type of interest rate (floating
or fixed), combined with currency or interest rate swaps (or both), to create a synthetic
security with the desired characteristics
22.
B. Securitization of Foreign Assets
Securitization of assets from countries outside of the United States has been slower to
occur. That has partly to do with the different economic environment and different
incentives in those countries. For instance, German banks did not feel a pressure
comparable to that for U.S. commercial banks to remove assets from their balance sheets
in order to meet the BIS 8 % capital adequacy requirement. Additionally, in many countries
legal obstacles to asset securitizations existed or do still exist; I will get back to these legal
obstacles in the main part of my article.
Many countries have developed the need to securitize assets prior to developing the legal
and technical framework necessary to do so. One such example is Japan, where banks
were coming under pressure to reduce their assets to comply with the capital adequacy
guidelines imposed by the Basle accord, but where certain legal problems impeded and
still impede domestic securitization
23. Financial institutions in such countries have found
and still may find it desirable to securitize their assets using special purpose vehicles in
securitization-friendly countries like the United States. For instance, of some 72 asset-
backed commercial paper programs established in the United States by commercial banks,
27 were sponsored by Japanese, European or Canadian banks
24. In particular, nine of
these programs were established to purchase non-U.S. receivables
25.
In a variation on this theme, non-U.S. banks have started international asset-backed
commercial paper programmes, allowing a number of companies to sell receivables to a
single vehicle
26. The first of these multi-seller vehicles sponsored by European banks8
emerged at the end of 1992, with Barclays' SCEPTRE and Morgan Grenfell/Deutsche
Bank's TWIN TOWERS programmes
27.
Because a number of sellers with a variety of receivables can share the costs of
securitizing, these multi-seller vehicles are particularly cost-effective
28. Such vehicles
should increase the viability of securitization as a financing tool in Europe by lowering
transaction costs, reducing administrative time and costs, and improving asset
diversification, name recognition and investor appeal
29.
C. Domestic Securitization Programs
The slowest process of all has been the process of establishing the legal framework for
securitization in individual countries. Those countries which have been successful in doing
so have found themselves home to many special purpose vehicles issuing securities
backed by assets from their own and/or foreign countries. Nevertheless for most countries
the process has been slow up to now.
The framework for securitization varies significantly from country to country, and the next
part will discuss such issues in detail for five selected European countries. Tax and
accounting questions will be omitted, however.
V. Selected European Countries
A. United Kingdom
1. Introduction
The United Kingdom has led Europe in securitization transactions, primarily through the
issuance of mortgage backed securities
30. Although the mortgage securitization market in
the UK is relatively small in relation to the total mortgage market
31, and the market has
developed without the benefit of government support
32, the UK has nevertheless developed
a sound framework for mortgage-backed securities
33.
The market for non-mortgage asset-backed securities, however, has been slower to
develop in the UK. Nevertheless, as of mid-1993 there had been seven term securitizations
involving assets other than first mortgages, totalling œ 1.388 bn
34. In addition, several UK
banks have also been involved in establishing asset-backed commercial paper (CP)
programmes
35.
The ABS issuances in the UK to date have involved car loans
36, home equity or second
mortgage loans
37, and tax-based vehicle finance leases
38. As of mid-1993 there had not
been a credit-card backed issuance in the UK
39.
2. Securitization Framework
The infrastructure in the UK, unlike many other countries in Europa, is fairly well suited for
asset securitization
40. Although there are no specific laws governing securitization, as, for
instance, in France
41, the regulatory authorities have, for the most part, been willing to
accommodate the growth of asset securitization.
a) Capital Adequacy
The Bank of England which regulates banks has instituted some fairly strict capital
adequacy requirements which ensure that a bank can have a reduced need for capital only
if it has no risk from the loans which it has sold
42. The same is true for the building societies
which are regulated by the Building Societies Commission
43. These building societies may,
pursuant to the 1986 Building Societies Act
44, issue mortgage-backed securities. Since
most issuances of mortgage-backed securities in the UK have left the originator with some
interest rate risk
45, banks and building societies have still had to provide fully in (their)
capital for the loans involved
46. A small number of issuances have attempted to deal with
this problem by laying off the interest rate risk to another institution
47.9
b) "True Sale"
Since asset securitizations are often undertaken for capital adequacy reasons, the
structure of these transactions often relies on the financial institution's ability to treat the
transfer of loans as a sale
48. The two issues here are how to transfer the underlying
receivables; and whether the SPV is independent from the seller in the event of the seller's
insolvency
49.
In the UK, there are generally three methods of transferring a receivable, novation,
assignment and sub-participation
50. Since novation (essentially a re-creation of the
obligation) requires the consent and cooperation of all three parties - the SPV, the
originator and the account debtor - it's infrequently done
51. Therefore this method of
transfer will not be discussed here any further.
There are two methods of transferring by assignment. They are legal and equitable
assignmet. Legal assignment seems at first glance ideal for asset securitization, since the
consequence of a legal assignment is that the whole and beneficial title is transferred to the
SPV, leaving little doubt that the transaction is a "true sale"
52. Legal assignment, however,
includes a statutory requirement to give written notice to the account debtor
53. This notice
requirement can pose problems for a potential asset securitizer because it is
administratively cumbersome, and because the securitizing institution may not wish to let
their account debtors know that their receivables have been financed, because it gives the
wrong impression
54.
Equitable assigment may prove an attractive alternative to legal assignment, since under
English law, an equitable assignment would qualify as a "true sale" and would not require
notice to the account debtor
55. There are several disadvantages, however, to using
equitable assignment as opposed to legal assignment
56. First, without notice, the account
debtor can discharge the receivable by payment to the originator
57. Second, the SPV is
subject to any set-off which the account debtor might obtain against the originator, both
before and after transfer
58. Third, there remains the possibility that a later sale of the SPV's
receivable to a bona-fide purchaser would defeat the SPV's interest in such receivable
59.
Fourth and finally, the SPV procedurally would not be able to sue directly, it must join the
originator in any legal proceeding
60.
The final method for transferring receivables in the UK is through a sub-participation. Sub-
participation, known as a back-to-back loan, is where another bank "purchases" financial
assets from their originator by making a loan to the "seller" with recourse limited to the sub-
participated assets
61. In order for such a transfer to be a "true sale", the seller must not
have any obligation to fund the repayment of the sub-participation loan
62.
c) Protection of SPV from Originator Insolvency
The bankruptcy-remoteness of the SPV is, of course, a major concern. For SPV's
established by banks to be treated as off-balance sheet for capital adequacy purposes,
essentially, there should not be any recourse legal, moral or financial from the SPV to the
originator of the loans. This is the main reason why, in Common law countries like the
United Kingdom, the SPV's are owned by Trusts whose share capital is owned by a third
party not linked in any way to the originator.
A further concern in the UK is that where equitable assignment has been used, it is
important that there are triggers inserted so that the SPV can perfect its equitable
assignment into a legal assignment by notice to the account debtor at any time when it
looks as though the originator is getting into financial difficulty
63.
In circumstances where the originator acts as the paying and servicing agent for the SPV
and therefore holds money on behalf of the SPV, the protection of the SPV's interest in the
collected receivables in the event there is an insolvency of the originator is also of
concern
64. In the UK, the most common way of protecting the SPV's interest is to set up a
separate account into which all payments that the originator receives are placed, and to
provide that that effectively is a trust account for the SPV
65. This should protect the SPV's
interest in the cash in the event of an insolvency as long as there is no commingling in that10
account
66. Further protection can be achieved by providing that the SPV takes a security
interest over the cash in the account
67.
B. The Netherlands
1. Introduction
Domestic securitization of assets from the Netherlands has, to my knowledge, not yet been
attempted
68. There has, however, been significant securitization activity in the Netherlands
in the form of securitized transactions originating in other countries for which Dutch special
purpose vehicles have been used as issuing entities
69. I therefore briefly discuss the
prospects for domestic securitization programs in the Netherlands, and then focuse on the
securitization infrastructure in the Netherlands, in particular as it relates to the
establishment of a SPV.
The reason that domestic securitization programs have not developed in the Netherlands
seem to be more economic than legal or technical
70. In particular, a primary reason is
simply that the major corporations and other institutions in the Netherlands lack the
economic incentive to do so
71. These institutions are still able to obtain funding at low
spreads by using more traditional forms of financing
72. Further obstacles to privatisation in
the Netherlands include the prohibitive costs associated with initial issues of asset-backed
securities
73 as well as the conservative approach allegedly taken by the Dutch financial
market and investors towards innovative financing techniques
74.
2. Securitization Framework
As mentioned earlier, although the Netherlands has as yet no domestic program in asset
securitization, it has been a preferred location for the bankruptcy-remote special purpose
vehicles used to issue asset-backed securities. Although the continued use of the
Netherlands as a "safe harbour" for SPV's has been cast into doubt by the introduction of
the new Dutch Civil Code
75 the Netherlands continue to offer certain tax and legal
advantages to SPVs. The major legal issues again are associated with the implications of a
transfer of receivables to the SPV, and with the bankruptcy-remoteness of the SPV.
a) Transfer of Receivables
Traditionally, Dutch law allowed for a very easy way of transferring receivables
76. A contract
between the seller and buyer was sufficient, and no notice to the account debtor was
required
77. The new Dutch Civil Code, however, requires that account debtors be notified in
order to effect transfer of legal title to receivables
78. Although the code does not formally
specify the type of notice required, in practice written notice will probably be necessary
79.
It is possible that this notice requirement could be avoided by not effecting a legal transfer
of the receivables, but instead using a sales contract whereby the originator sells a portfolio
of receivables but does not transfer it to the SPV and it is agreed that the SPV will have to
write to obtain title to the receivables on first demand
80. However, there is little or no case
law on the implications of such a transfer, so whether or not it would legally achieve the
same result as a straight transfer of legal title is a matter of speculation
81.
Additional issues related to the transfer of receivables include: the ability to transfer future
receivables, the effect of a transfer on the security attached to the receivables, and the
ability to match maturities with an asset securitization
82. Such issues are highly complex
and beyond the scope of this article. It is sufficient to say that while these concerns may
make certain types of securitization problematic, they should not in general pose serious
problems
83.
The securitized receivables, once transferred to the SPV, must be charged in favour of the
investors
84. In the past this was accomplished through either a fiduciary assignment or a
pledge of the receivables in favour of the investors
85. The new Dutch Civil Code provides
only for a pledge of the receivables, and as of 1992 all fiduciary assignments were
converted into pledges
86.11
b) Bankruptcy-Remoteness
In the situation where an originator wishes to securitize receivables through a Dutch SPV,
such SPV would probably be set up with the help of a bank
87. The originator would then sell
its receivables to the Dutch SPV, which would issue securities backed by the receivables in
order to fund the purchase price
88. Credit enhancement may be limited to over-
collateralization, or may include insurance such as a letter of credit provided by the bank
aiding in the establishment of the SPV
89.
In this context, it is important to reduce as much as practicable the possibility that the
bankruptcy of the shareholders of the SPV triggers the bankruptcy of the SPV
90. A SPV
may be insulated to some extent from the insolvency of its shareholders through the
creation of a foundation ("stitching") which holds all shares of the SPV
91. This foundation
would most likely be managed by a board of management elected by the bank aiding the
foreign corporation in its establishment of a Dutch SPV
92. It should be specifically provided
in the Articles of Association of such foundation that the foundation serves only to hold the
shares in the SPV, and that it has neither the right to undertake any other activity than
exercising its shareholders' rights, nor the right to incur any liability
93.
To further limit the risks associated with bankruptcy of the originating corporation, it should
be ensured that the SPV itself does not enter into transactions other than the securitization
transaction in question
94. In short, a separate SPV ought to be set up for each individual
securitization transaction, and the objects and purposes clause of the Articles of
Association of the SPV should limit the SPV to such transactions as are necessary to effect
the securitization
95.
c) Regulatory Questions
A further cause for concern is the possibility that a SPV located in the Netherlands might
be considered a "credit institution" or a "capital market institution", and would thereby have
to comply with the Dutch Banking Act and the governance of the Dutch central bank
96. In
principle, a SPV could easily fall within the definition of a "credit institution" or a "capital
market institution"
97. However, the Dutch central bank has laid down special policies for
companies engaged in the business of the receipt of funds from non-residents and on
paying such funds to non-residents, so-called "finance companies"
98. A SPV issuing
securities backed by foreign receivables would clearly qualify as such a "finance
company"
99.
The Dutch central bank policies on finance companies provide that if they adhere to certain
ground rules, they will not be regarded to be credit institutions or capital market
institutions
100. These ground rules essentially boil down to a requirement that, in order to
avoid becoming subject to central bank supervision, a SPV must only issue debt with a
maturity of two years or more and it may issue that debt only to professional investors
101.
C. France
1. Introduction
Securitization was introduced into French law in 1988, as part of a general modernization
of the French financial context
102. The basic legal framework was established with Law no
88-121 (December 25, 1988), and that Act has since been supplemented by numerous
implementation decrees and regulations, as well as a recent Law no 93-6 (January 4,
1993)
103.
France chose to promote securitization for a number of reasons. One of the main goals of
the introduction of securitization in France was to enable credit  institutions to sell their
receivables secured by mortgages
104. This explains why the 1988 Law as implemented only
permitted securitization of receivables with at least a two-year final maturity
105. However, as
of early 1993 there had been only one securitization of French mortgages
106.12
A second purpose for promoting securitization in France was to aid French credit
institutions to abide by the minimum solvency ratio of 8 % set by the BIS for international
banks
107.
Beginning on January 1, 1993, this solvency ratio was extended to all credit institutions in
the European Community pursuant to the EC Directive no. 89/647 of December 18,
1989
108. Since French credit institutions had previously only been subject to a minimum
ratio of 5 %, the application of the BIS solvency ratio significantly increased the capital
requirements of French credit institutions
109. Accordingly it became crucial for the public
authorities to assist French banks in meeting these new requirements, and the introduction
into France of the technique of securitization was intended to help French banking
institutions to increase their capital in the same conditions as their foreign counterparts
110.
A third and related purpose for permitting asset securitization in France was an effort to
strengthen the international competitiveness of French credit institutions
111. Asset
securitization would give French credit institutions access to the same funding options
available to American banks, in order to replace traditional funding sources the costs of
which are rising, such as retail deposits and commercial paper
112.
As of the end of 1992, there had been a total of 55 non-mortgage asset securitizations in
France, and one mortgage securitization
113.
2. Securitization Framework
Although the framework for securitization in France was, as mentioned earlier, established
in 1988, providing potential French securitizers with a clear legal accounting and tax road
to follow in order to structure an operation, the growth of securitization thus far has been
slow
114. Technical, financial, and legal obstacles have combined to slow the growth of
securitization.
a) The "Fonds Commun de Cr‚ances" (FCC)
As discussed earlier, the legal framework for securitization was established with Law no
88-121 (December 23, 1988). This law established a new type of special purpose vehicle,
called a Fonds Commun de Cr‚ances (FCC)
115. In the simplest terms, a FCC owns a pool of
cr‚ances (receivables) and issues parts (share certificates) to investors. These shares are
not beneficial interests, but instead represent a direct claim on the FCC's assets
116. A FCC
is not subject to corporate or insolvency law; instead it can be characterised as a co-
proprietorship among investors. The FCC is initiated by a management company which
administers it and represents it against third parties
117. In addition, there is a depositary
which holds the receivables and accounts of the FCC and controls the decisions of the
management company
118.
However, the initial statutory regime as established by the 1988 Law was not ideal for
general securitization as it included certain restrictions and obstacles
119. Many of those
obstacles have been removed meanwhile, although some still remain.
A major obstacle to the development of securitization in France arising from the 1988 Law
was its requirement that receivables eligible for securitization must have a maturity of at
least two years
120. This requirement effectively ruled out the securitization of credit card
receivables and other revolving credit assets
121, as well as short term consumer loans
122. A
March 27, 1993 decree implementing the 1993 Law has, however, eliminated the
requirement of a minimum maturity for securitized receivables
123. Securitization of credit
card receivables and other short term assets is therefore possible under the current French
legal framework.
The 1988 Law further limited the types of receivables which could be securitized  in France
to "secure" receivables, i.e., receivables which are neither fixed nor doubtful nor subject to
judiciary proceedings
124. This restriction, while strongly criticized
125, remains in place. Thus
French institutions may not securitize doubtful receivables or bad debts, such as troubled
real estate loans or doubtful receivables from developing countries
126.13
The 1988 Law further limited the receivables eligible for securitization to those represented
by credit operations of the same nature
127. The 1993 Law, however, has removed this
requirement
128.
Until the 1993 Law, securitization in France was limited to assets held by credit
institutions
129. The 1993 law extended the scope of receivables eligible for securitization to
receivables held by insurance companies
130. At present, however, companies other than
credit institutions and insurance companies may not securitize their assets
131, although the
extension of securitization to receivables held by commercial companies has been
suggested as a further modification to the French legal framework
132.
Pursuant to the 1988 Law, FCCs could not substitute new assets for the original ones, or
proceed with further acquisitions of receivables
133. This limitation impacted the profitability
issuance with a maturity longer than the life of the underlying assets
134. The 1993 Law has
removed this limitation and now allows FCCs to acquire securitized receivables after the
issuance of the certificates, the effect of which is to contribute to the overall reduction of the
total cost of the securitization process
135.
b) Bankruptcy Issues
A major concern for French securitizers is that, in the event that bankruptcy proceedings
are initiated against the institution assigning the securitized receivables or the institution
responsible for the management of the FCC no mechanism presently exists which would
permit the legal isolation of sums or receivables located within one of the above entities
and which belong to the FCC
136. In the event such bankruptcy proceedings did occur,
current French law would treat the FCC as a non-privileged creditor
137.
The most recent draft of the French law on trust (hereinafter "draft trust law") would afford
the FCC greater protection in the event of a bankruptcy. The draft trust law provides that
the trust "is a contract pursuant to which a settlor transfers all or part of its assets to a
trustee. ... the latter being in charge of acting for the settlor or the beneficiaries, for a
specific purpose"
138. In a securitization transaction, the entity transferring the receivables
would be the settlor, the management company and the depositary would represent the
trustees, and the holders of FCC shares would be the beneficiaries
139.
The draft trust law would afford the receivables full protection in the event of a bankruptcy
affecting the transferring entity, the management company or the depositary by providing
that the assets and rights transferred to the trustee constitute separate assets which may
not be attached or pledged by the creditors of the settlor or of the trustee
140. In addition, it
would create a direct contractual relationship between the institution transferring the
receivables and the management company
141.
The draft trust law is still subject to a number of uncertainties from a legal and tax
standpoint
142. Further modifications of the law will therefore be required if the improvements
described above are to be fully realized
143.
c) Regulatory Framework
The Commission des Op‚rations de Bourse (COB) generally regulates French financial
institutions, along with the Comit‚ de la R‚glementation Bancaire, the Service de Legislation
Fiscale, and the Banque de France
144. The French regulatory authorities have taken more
stringent positions than their counterparts in other European countries on several issues
145.
Some of the more stringent requirements imposed by French regulators are related to
investor protection
146. For example, the creation or liquidation of an FCC used to require
the prior consent of the COB, following consultation with the Banque de France
147. As part
of this process the COB had to be provided with a report on the certificates to be issued by
the FCC and the pool of receivables, prepared by a rating agency approved for this
purpose by the French Ministry of Finance
148. The 1993 Law has simplified this approval
process, so that only the management company of the FCC requires such prior approval
149.14
The rating agency report described above, however, must still be submitted to the COB for
consultation, and must be provided with an issue offering circular to the subscribers of the
FCC's certificates
150.
A further restriction which the COB has placed on French securitization is that it requires
that the offering itself must be made with a firm underwriting commitment that the
placement period shall not exceed thirty days
151. In addition, the COB provides for specific
procedures related to the end of the certificates subscription period and provides that
certificates of the FCC must be listed on a French exchange market, unless their initial par
value is 1,000,000 French francs or more
152. On a positive note, however, the above-
mentioned restrictions may soon be modified by the COB
153.
In addition, French law requires a FCC to provide credit enhancement in the form of an
external guarantee of a financial institution, credit institution or an insurance company,
over-collateralization or a subordinated class of certificates (such certificates may not be,
however, held by individuals or UCITs)
154. According to practitioners, this system is
sometimes inadequate since it is limited to the risk of the debtor's default and it is often too
complex, particularly for transactions presenting few risks or already covered through other
guaranties
155.
D. Belgium
1. Introduction
Belgium is another interesting case which shows some of the traditional impediments to the
creation of secondary markets for receivables in European countries on one side as well as
their recent efforts to modernize their financial systems on the other.
Securitization in  its proper sense has not been practical in the past in Belgium for several
reasons
156. Belgian law until recently provided no form of entity that could serve as a
special purpose vehicle, and the legal procedures governing the assignment and sale of
receivables remain burdensome and thus hinder large-scale transfers of receivables.
2. Securitization Framework
a) Assignment of Receivables
The main general legal constraint on securitization in Belgium is found in Article 1690 of
the Civil Code. An assignment of receivables is subject to the procedures set forth in this
article. In order for the sale of a receivable to be opposable to third parties, Art. 1690
requires either the notification of such transfer to the debtor by bailiff or, alternatively, the
acceptance of such transfer by the debtor in a deed drawn up before a notary public. Given
the time and costs involved in complying with these requirements, it is obvious that any
mass assignment of receivables is impossible in a practical and economic sense. However,
draft legislation aimed at abolishing these requirements has been prepared and is currently
before Parliament. Under the draft legislation, the assignment of debt will be legally valid
and opposable to third parties in the event of mere agreement between the assignor and
the assignee. The bill further provides that the assignment of a receivable is opposable to
the debtor, on the condition that the debtor has been simply notified (with no formalities
required) of the assignment
157.
2. The Special Purpose Vehicle Law of 1992
Until recently, Belgian law did not provide for a form of entity that could serve as a special
purpose vehicle. Special purpose vehicle legislation, however, has now been enacted. A
new law, as of August 5, 1992 has been enacted to create a legal framework for the
"Organismes de placement en cr‚ances/Instellingen voor belegging in schuldvorderingen"
('Institutions for investments in receivables", IIR). This form of entity may be set up either
under existing corporate law or by way of a contract among the parties. The statutory
corporate version ist called a "soci‚t‚ d'investissement en cr‚ances - vennootschap voor
belegging in schuldvorderingen", and the contractual version is known as a "fonds de
placement en cr‚ances - fonds voor belegging in schuldvorderingen".15
These special Belgian vehicles, whether corporate SPVs or contractual SPVs, must be
administered by a separate management company
158. Royal decrees which are to
implement several provisions of the law are still to be promulgated
159.
E. Germany
Asset-backed securitisation has begun only recently in Germany. A few German
companies have already securitised auto loans in the U.S. market or German trade
receivables via off-shore special purpose vehicles, enabling them to sell their assets
anonymously. There have also been two Deutsche Mark-denominated transactions
involving consumer loans
160. Deutsche Bank has recently set up a SPV on the Isle of
Jersey with the purpose to fund the acquisition of receivables and similar assets by
issuance of notes.
ABS is, in principle, legally feasible in Germany. Loans or other receivables can be
assigned easily without the consent of the debtor or additional formalities. Although an
Anglo-Saxon style trust cannot be formed under German law, a SPV could be created in
the form of a limited liability company
161. The use of off-shore SPVs so far is mainly tax
driven.
Asset-backed products in Germany face some more other obstacles. The attitude of the
Federal Banking Supervisory Agency (Bundesaufsichtsamt f￿r das Kreditwesen, Berlin) is
somewhat reserved as far as sales of loan receivables by banks are concerned. A further
impediment lies in the structure of the primary lending market. These are dominated by
credit institutions offering the full range of financial products (Universalbanken). Lending
markets are very competitive, and the low credit margins make it difficult to cover the
additional transaction costs associated with securitization. There may be more incentive for
securitization for car loans, leasing firms or firms with large masses of trade receivables.
As to mortgage-backed securities, a similar structure exists in the Hypothekenbanksystem.
For over two hundred years, German mortgage banks have funded themselves by issuing
Pfandbriefe, making these one of the earliest kind of mortgage-backed securities. In
contrast with US asset-backed techniques, however, the underlying loans stay on the
balance sheet of the mortgage bank. Another difference from the US and UK situations is
that a German mortgage bank may exclude the prepayment of a loan secured by a
mortgage. Unlike US and UK mortgage-backed bonds, therefore, German
Hypothekenbankpfandbriefe have no prepayment risk.
This combination of an efficient existing funding system and the strong capitalisation of the
mortgage banks suggests that the development of an off-balance sheet mortgage-backed
security market is unlikely in Germany
162.
VI. Concluding Remarks
In Europe, securitisation has been more discussed than practised so far. Many structural
impediments, tax, regulatory and legal, remain. These will be repealed the more
competition and internationalization of the capital markets will develop, and the demands of
the originators of receivables as well as of the investors will press legislators and regulators
to provide for the necessary frameworks. As always, more in-depth comparative studies
than could been made here will help us to develop our national legal and regulatory
systems further. While profitting from each other in that way in Europe we should carefully
see to maintain the advantage of having various competing sets of rules
163.16
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